INTRODUCTION
To bring a claim in federal court, plaintiffs must satisfy the standing requirement found in Article III's "case" or "controversy" language. 1 Over time, the Court has refined standing doctrine by framing it in terms of three neat, formalist elements: injury in fact, causation, and redressability. 2 The Court's articulation of standing has provided additional clarification for parties but has also raised new questions regarding the doctrine's limits. 3 Because of standing's threshold nature, resolving these questions has consequences for countless federal cases. 4 One area of significant controversy is what constitutes a cognizable injury in fact. Without one, a plaintiff cannot file suit in federal court. In the past, the Supreme Court has described cognizable injuries as "concrete and particularized, . . . 'actual or imminent, [and] not " conjectural" or "hypothetical." ' " 5 Until the Court's 2016 decision in Spokeo, Inc . v . Robins, lower courts generally treated the "concrete and particularized" language as one requirement: particularized injuries were presumed to be sufficiently con-crete. 6 But in Spokeo, the Court made clear that concreteness is a separate, necessary requirement for a cognizable injury in fact. 7 Yet Spokeo only further confused standing doctrine. The Court held that a plaintiff raising a statutory violation under a private right of action must have suffered some concrete injury beyond the mere violation. 8 In doing so, the Court created new distinctions in the doctrine, dividing tangible from intangible harms, and "bare procedural violation[s]" from "risk[s] of real harm." 9 The interplay between Spokeo and the doctrine's constitutional nature has created significant confusion in the lower courts. 10 A confused jurisprudence could, as Justice Harlan feared, reduce "constitutional standing to a word game played by secret rules." 11 A confused standing doctrine is especially troubling in the area of consumer protection because it may prevent consumers from vindicating their interests in a federal forum. 12 The modern patchwork of federal laws can be a powerful tool for consumer interests. 13 Yet since its inception, the system has been underfunded and underenforced. 14 As a result, federal consumer protection statutes are heavily reliant upon private rights of action to police bad behavior. 15 Private right of action provisions enable consumers wronged by fraudulent business practices to vindicate their rights by acting as their own "private attorneys general." 16 Crucially, standing doctrine limits the reach of 6 . See 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). 7 . Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548; see also id . at 1555 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (observing that Spokeo was the first case to explicitly "discuss the separate offices of the terms 'concrete' and 'particularized.' "). 8 . Id . at 1549 (majority opinion). 9 . Id . 10 . See infra Parts II-III. 11. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 12. Consumer protection laws are "intended to protect the public as a whole, not just to provide rules for deciding private disputes. 15 . See Budnitz, supra note 12, at 664. 16 . See id . at 689 ("Public consumer laws are intended to protect the general consumer population, but Congress recognized that government enforcement agencies lack the resources to ensure satisfaction of that goal. The private attorney general provisions can go far toward achieving that goal if other obstacles do not stand in the way.").
[Vol. 118:471 such private rights of action. 17 Because standing is constitutional, it cannot be statutorily conferred. 18 How lower courts apply Spokeo, then, has enormous implications for the future of consumer protection statutes. This Note argues that lower courts have applied the Spokeo standard for standing to certain consumer protection statutes in an overly strict and inconsistent fashion. Part I tracks the development of Article III standing from the original language of "cases" or "controversies" through the formulation of its modern three-part structure in Lujan v . Defenders of Wildlife to the Court's decision in Spokeo. Part II introduces an active circuit split between the Third and Ninth Circuits, which concerns standing under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), as a heuristic for subsequent discussion. Part III offers a novel taxonomy of intangible harms recognized by lower courts in applying the Spokeo analysis. Finally, Part IV provides a starting point for a more consistent standing doctrine through greater deference to congressional factfinding.
I. BACKGROUND
This Part briefly tracks the development of the Court's modern standing doctrine, culminating in Spokeo's "concrete injury" standard. Section I.A describes standing's constitutional roots, with an emphasis on the Court's influential Lujan decision. Section I.B provides the background for the Court's 2016 Spokeo decision and its focus on concreteness. Section I.C explores the standard for intangible harms and highlights persistent ambiguities.
A. The Development of Standing Doctrine
Modern standing has its roots in Article III of the Constitution, which restricts the judicial branch's authority to "cases" and "controversies." 19 These terms set familiar baselines: courts preside over legal disputes between adversarial parties that can be resolved with a decision. 20 But standing as a distinct constitutional doctrine did not gain significant force until the latter half of the twentieth century. 21 Two primary justifications have shaped the doctrine. The first justification concerns separation of 17 powers: the case-or-controversy requirement ensures that courts retain their traditional role as adjudicators of live disputes and are not pushed into legislative or executive roles. 22 The second is pragmatic: standing conserves judicial resources and ensures that consequential matters are brought by motimotivated plaintiffs. 23 Justice Scalia's Lujan opinion "significantly shift[ed] the law of standing" to its modern tripartite framework. 24 A plaintiff must first prove that she has suffered an injury in fact, defined as "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is [both] (a) concrete and particularized and (b) 'actual or imminent, not "conjectural" or "hypothetical." ' " 25 Second, a plaintiff must show a "causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of," and third, "it must be 'likely' . . . that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision. ' " 26 In laying out the modern elements of standing, Lujan also demonstrated the impact of the doctrine's constitutional roots. The case concerned a challenge to a federal regulation that restricted the reach of an Endangered Species Act (ESA) protection to within U.S. territory. 27 Plaintiffs challenged the regulation under the ESA's citizen-suit provision. 28 They alleged that the move risked the extinction of certain species abroad, which would cause aesthetic and vocational injuries to the plaintiffs. 29 [Vol. 118:471 The Court rejected the claim that plaintiffs could establish standing via the ESA's citizen-suit provision without alleging an injury in fact. 31 It reasoned that the statutory procedure in question must protect some "separate concrete interest," not a "generally available grievance about government." 32 This established an important strand in the Court's standing jurisprudence: because standing is constitutional, Congress lacks the authority to disregard injury in fact. 33 Nevertheless, Congress still has a role to play in conferring standing, though that role is imprecise. The majority acknowledged the special nature of "procedural rights" 34 insofar as they justify loosening the standards for immediacy and redressability. 35 Justice Kennedy, in an influential concurrence, went a step further, observing that "Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before." 36 The ESA's citizen-suit provision failed to do so, however, because it did not "identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate [it] to the class of persons entitled to bring suit." 37 Beyond these comments, however, Congress's authority to bestow standing lacked muchneeded clarity.
B. Spokeo and the Concrete Injury Requirement
Spokeo picked up where Lujan left off and gave concreteness meaning independent of particularity. Thomas Robins filed suit against Spokeo, Inc., an online "people search engine" often used for background checks, 38 for violating the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). 39 Robins claimed that Spokeo listed false information-that he was married, had children, was in his 50s, was wealthy, and held a graduate degree-when Robins was actually 31 . Id . at 572-73. 32 . Id . "We do not hold that an individual cannot enforce procedural rights; he assuredly can, so long as the procedures in question are designed to protect some threatened concrete interest . . . ." Id . at 573 n. young, uneducated, and unemployed. 40 These inaccuracies were caused by Spokeo's alleged failure to comply with the FCRA's regulations for consumer reporting agencies, particularly the obligation to "follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy." 41 The district court dismissed Robins's claim for want of a cognizable injury. 42 The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that Robins's injury was both concrete and particular because his "personal interests in the handling of his credit information are individualized rather than collective." 43 The Supreme Court ultimately vacated and remanded, holding that the Ninth Circuit improperly found Robins's alleged procedural violation to be a concrete injury in fact. 44 The Court agreed that Robins's injury was sufficiently particular but found that the Ninth Circuit overlooked the concreteness requirement. 45 In so doing, the Court found that particularity alone is necessary but not sufficient for standing-"[a]n injury in fact must also be 'concrete.' " 46 The Spokeo Court further explained that an injury is concrete when it is " 'de facto'; . . . it must actually exist." 47 Concrete means " 'real,' and not 'abstract.' " 48 But the Court clarified that "concrete" does not necessarily mean "tangible." 49 Rather, concrete injuries take two forms: tangible or intangible. 50 Tangible concrete injuries, the Court admitted, are "easier to recognize" than the intangible variety. 51 In fact, commentators generally agree that tangibility is sufficient to establish concreteness. 52 The more interesting question, and the focus of this Note, is which intangible injuries are sufficiently concrete for purposes of standing.
C. Intangible Harms
Spokeo does not affect standing for harms arising from violations of the Constitution. 53 To help identify intangible concrete injuries that are not constitutionally derived, the Court provided branching lines of inquiry for lower courts to puzzle through. 54 At bottom, an intangible injury is concrete if it is supported, to some indefinite degree, by history and the judgment of Congress, and the injury entails at least a risk of real harm to the plaintiff. 55 For cognizable intangible injuries, the Court directed that "both history and the judgment of Congress play important roles." 56 The history component requires a court to inquire "whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts." 57 Use of the language "close relationship" is significant-it implies that courts should engage in a process of analogy but need not find a one-to-one analogue between a plaintiff's alleged harm and the common law. 58 Further, the judgment of Congress "is also instructive and important" because "Congress is well positioned to identify intangible harms." 59 The Spokeo Court referred back to Lujan and observed "that Congress may 'elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable . . . injuries that were previously inadequate,' " 60 and that it may "define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed be- fore." 61 Yet the Court qualified that a statutory violation that is otherwise "divorced from any concrete harm"-termed "a bare procedural violation"does not confer standing. 62 Congress's judgment is especially relevant when a plaintiff's alleged intangible injury manifests as a "risk of real harm." 63 The Spokeo Court recognized that this "real harm" can be uncontroversially concrete even when "difficult to prove or measure," such as in the case of slander per se. 64 Plaintiffs can invoke a congressionally granted procedural right-here, the right to enforce an accurate report-meant to protect the plaintiff from an intangible risk of harm without the "need [to] allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified." 65 As an example, the Court cited its line of cases that upheld standing when plaintiffs suffered various "informational injuries," like voters who were denied information on campaign contributions to which they were statutorily entitled. 66 Some procedural violations are sufficiently concrete in themselves, while others require articulating a consequent risk of harm from the violation. 67 Though the majority opinion punted on the resolution of Robins's standing by remanding the case, it provided two examples of procedural violations of the FCRA that would nevertheless fall short of a concrete injury. 68 First, Robins's information could be entirely accurate but Spokeo simply failed to provide him statutorily required notice. 69 Though a procedural violation, this would not constitute an injury sufficient to confer standing. Second, his information could be inaccurate but trivially so. 70 For example, an "incorrect zip code" could not, "without more, . . . work any concrete harm." 71 Whether other inaccuracies were merely trivial or instead resulted in concrete injury became a question for the Ninth Circuit on remand. 72 The Court's discussion of congressional judgment left lingering questions. First, little was said about the relationship between the dual factors of history and judgment. Is the test, for example, disjunctive or conjunctive? Here, some courts and commentators have adopted a disjunctive interpretation: an intangible injury may be concrete even if one of the two factors is not present. 73 Second, the Court did not explain how to identify Congress's judgment nor how much weight it carries in the analysis. Here, lower courts have largely cohered around a two-step analysis first articulated by the Second Circuit in Strubel v . Comenity Bank. 74 The Ninth Circuit, in the remand of Spokeo, summarized the Strubel test as whether (1) the provision at issue was established to protect a plaintiff's concrete interest and (2) the interest was actually at risk of harm in the case. 75 On remand, the Ninth Circuit again granted Robins standing. 76 In Spokeo's wake, lower courts have struggled to adopt a consistent methodology for identifying intangible concrete injuries across a range of alleged violations of comparable consumer protection laws. This muddled jurisprudence is exemplified by the conflicting approaches that the Third and Ninth Circuit have embraced, which is the focus of Part II. utes designed to protect consumer interests. This split between the Third and Ninth Circuits constitutes a meaningful issue for plaintiffs challenging violations of the FCRA disclosure requirements but also offers a useful heuristic for conceiving of intangible harms under Spokeo.
II. THE DUTTA-LONG CIRCUIT SPLIT
The FCRA regulates the use of credit reports for hiring and employment purposes. 80 An employer may, based on information in a properly obtained report, choose to take an "adverse action" against a current or prospective employee. 81 Before taking such an adverse action, however, the employer must first provide the employee a copy of the report and an opportunity to respond. 82 Though Congress's most obvious concern was to correct inaccurate reports, the provision also allows the employee to "bring additional facts to the employer's attention" and "present her side of the story 'even where the facts are clear.' " 83 The Third and Ninth Circuits have split over whether failing to provide an employee a copy of her report constitutes a cognizable injury when there is no likelihood that presenting the employee's side of the story will alter the ultimate outcome.
The Ninth Circuit in Dutta concluded that such a plaintiff lacks standing. 84 As part of its hiring process, State Farm obtained Bobby Dutta's credit report in 2014. 85 After identifying issues in his credit history that disqualified him for the position, State Farm informed Dutta that he had been rejected. 86 Dutta was not provided an actual copy of his credit report, which contained several factual errors, until several days after he had been rejected. 87 Even after Dutta identified the report's mistakes, however, State Farm again informed him that he had been rejected. 88 The Ninth Circuit denied Dutta standing for his claim under the FCRA because State Farm's procedural violation did not ultimately harm Dutta. 89 Citing State Farm's undisputed hiring policy, the court concluded that the accurate portions of his credit report "alone disqualified Dutta from" the position. 90 Because any inaccuracies that Dutta provided would be immaterial to his employment, his inability to explain them was not a concrete injury. 91
The employer must also provide "a description in writing of the rights of the consumer under this subchapter." [Vol. 118:471 The Third Circuit in Long, on the other hand, recognized standing for a similar situation. Three plaintiffs, each with prior drug convictions, applied for employment with the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA). 92 Though it first appeared that the plaintiffs had been successfully hired, SEPTA later informed each that they were not hired pursuant to SEPTA's " 'categorical lifetime ban' on hiring anyone convicted of a [drug] crime." 93 Crucially, SEPTA did not provide the plaintiffs copies of their background checks before informing them of its decisions. 94 The plaintiffs filed an FCRA claim, arguing that, while their background checks were accurate, SEPTA nevertheless deprived them of their statutory right to review the reports and respond before an adverse action. 95 In recognizing standing, the Third Circuit insisted that "the FCRA does not condition the right to receive a consumer report on whether having the report would allow an individual to stave off an adverse employment action." 96 These conflicting outcomes stem from the courts' differing views of the interests protected by the FCRA's prior disclosure provision. Tellingly, the Ninth Circuit exclusively characterized the disclosure provision's purpose as correcting "false information" and providing "the opportunity to contest erroneous information." 97 The Third Circuit, however, adopted a broader view of the provision, going beyond merely ensuring the accuracy of reports. 98 Specifically, the Third Circuit identified four purposes served: "[A]ccuracy, relevancy, proper utilization, and fairness." 99 Even if the reports had been perfectly accurate, the plaintiffs were still deprived of a fair and transparent process that would have allowed them to present their side of the story. The Third Circuit also emphasized Congress's prophylactic aims, interpreting the FCRA's disclosure provision as serving important functions beyond the employment opportunity at issue. 100 For the plaintiffs in Long, the lack of prior disclosure, while not affecting their immediate employment at SEPTA, did have other repercussions. The court noted that prior disclosure allows "individuals to know beforehand when their consumer reports might be used (2012)).
105. This Note will focus on the FCRA, FACTA, TCPA, and FDCPA, using other statutes to draw comparisons.
[Vol. 118:471 As this Part demonstrates, these categories are not fixed, but they nevertheless provide a starting point for assessing the state of the doctrine. 106
A. Privacy Harms
In these cases, plaintiffs allege that defendant's statutory violation resulted in a concrete injury to their privacy interests by revealing identifying, often sensitive, information about the individual or by entering the plaintiff's personal space. 107 Courts have identified three variants on this core claim: a "traditional" invasion of privacy through dispersion of identifying information, 108 intrusion upon a plaintiff's seclusion, 109 and breach of confidence. 110 Distinguishing between these categories can be difficult, and much turns on the individual judges' characterization of the harm.
Invasion of Privacy
Under Spokeo's first factor for intangible harms, courts have identified a robust historical basis on which plaintiffs may allege privacy harms. For example, in Eichenberger v . ESPN, Inc ., the Ninth Circuit considered an alleged violation of the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) resulting from sharing customers' information with a third party. 111 The court identified a historical corollary to the alleged harm, observing that "[v]iolations of the right to privacy have long been actionable at common law." 112 Applying this common law conception to modern concerns about individuals' information, the court continued that "both the common law and the literal understanding of privacy encompass the individual's control of information concerning his or her person." 113 The Third Circuit similarly identified privacy harms as a distinct injury. In In re Horizon Healthcare Services Inc . Data Breach Litigation, concerning release of information in violation of the FCRA, Judge Shwartz's concurring opinion clarified that an individual's injury premised on a privacy interest is sufficient even without an injury tied to economic loss. 114 Privacy on its own has "sufficient historical roots to satisfy . . . concrete harm for standing purposes." 115 Courts have also found that invasion of privacy satisfies Spokeo's second factor: the judgment of Congress. Courts inquire, on a statute-by-statute basis, whether Congress intended the procedural requirement in question to safeguard an individual's privacy interest. For example, courts have held that the VPPA 116 and the FCRA 117 both include procedural requirements calibrated to prevent privacy injuries.
Eichenberger and Horizon Healthcare invoked a distinction that separates viable privacy injuries from nonviable ones: the personal information in question must be disseminated. 118 The centrality of dissemination in privacy harms is demonstrated in a D.C. Circuit opinion. 119 In that case, four truck drivers sued the Department of Transportation because its database listed inaccurate information about them in violation of the FCRA. 120 The court recognized standing for the two truckers whose information had been shared with third parties, but not for the two whose information had remained in the department's control. 121 This distinction is grounded in both history and the judgment of Congress. First, the court observed that there is "no historical or common-law analog where the mere existence of inaccurate information, absent dissemination, amounts to concrete injury." 122 Second, the court recognized that "the harm Congress was concerned about was the dissemination of inaccurate information, not its mere existence." 123 [Vol. 118:471 
Intrusion upon Seclusion
A second variant of an individual's privacy interest is the harm of intrusion upon seclusion. 124 Unlike the invasion-of-privacy harms, these cases involve intrusions into a person's space. Courts have most often identified this harm in cases arising under the TCPA in which defendants called or otherwise messaged individuals without their consent. 125 For example, in Van Patten v . Vertical Fitness, the Ninth Circuit held that unsolicited text messages sent to the plaintiff satisfied the concrete injury requirement. 126 Invoking Spokeo's two factors, history and the judgment of Congress, the court observed that "[a]ctions to remedy defendants' . . . intrusion upon seclusion, and nuisance have long been heard by American courts" and, further, that "Congress sought to protect consumers from the unwanted intrusion and nuisance of unsolicited telemarketing phone calls and fax advertisements." 127 The Third Circuit reached the same conclusions in the context of unsolicited phone calls. 128 District courts have almost uniformly reached the same conclusion when presented with similar facts. 129
Breach of Confidence
The third privacy variant is harm resulting from a breach of confidence-a holder of data violates a legal duty to refrain from disclosing spe- cific information provided by the consumer. 130 Unlike a traditional privacy tort, there is no third-party requirement. 131 Instead, "the harm from a breach of confidence occurs when the plaintiff's trust in the breaching party is violated." 132 This theory is not commonly used but has been endorsed by the Eleventh and D.C. Circuits. 133 Muransky v . Godiva Chocolatier, Inc . analogized the defendant-business's practice of printing ten digits of a plaintiff's credit card number on customer receipts, in violation of FACTA, 134 to a breach of confidence because the information was "not kept confidential." 135
B. Personal and Property Torts
Courts have also identified theories of standing premised on historical torts to persons and property, including harm to reputation via defamation and slander, emotional harm, and traditional property torts of trespass to chattels and implied bailment.
Defamation and Slander
The first tortious harms are defamation and slander. The Ninth Circuit's reconsideration of Spokeo on remand typifies these injuries. 136 First, the court stated that the FCRA's prohibition on inaccurate credit reports was intended to protect individuals' concrete interests. 137 135 . Muransky, 922 F.3d at 1191 (11th Cir. 2019) ("A consumer provides a merchant with his credit card number with the expectation that it will remain secret . . . . FACTA gives legal protection to that confidentiality interest by permitting merchants to print only the last five digits of a credit card number."); see also Solow-Niederman, supra note 130, at 625 ("[G]iven their relationship to consumers, the holders of consumer data in commercial transactions should be labeled with a distinct term: data confidants."). [Vol. 118:471 long been protected in the law," particularly when defamatory statements relate to a person's business. 138 Importantly, these historical actions required no evidence of actual harm suffered by the plaintiff. 139 Finally, Robins's inaccuracies were not trivial but risked "real harm" because of the importance of credit reports to employers. 140 Courts have made two additional observations about slander as an injury. First, as with privacy harms, historical torts of libel or slander per se "require evidence of publication" or dissemination to third parties. 141 Second, any slanderous information must be harmful; trivial inaccuracies are not sufficient. 142 As the Ninth Circuit stated, not "every inaccuracy in these categories . . . will necessarily establish concrete injury." 143
Infliction of Emotional Distress
The second tortious theory confers standing to plaintiffs that suffered emotional distress as a result of a statutory violation. 144 In Ben-Davies v . Blibaum & Associates, the Fourth Circuit held that an erroneous statement of the amount that plaintiff owed 145 was a sufficiently concrete injury to confer standing because the plaintiff " 'suffered' . . . actually existing intangible harms that affect her personally: 'emotional distress, anger, and frustration.' " 146 Unlike other cases in which courts only mentioned emotional dis- 
Trespass to Chattels
A third tort-based theory of intangible harm relates to the plaintiff's property interests and has arisen in the context of the TCPA. 149 Mey v . Got Warranty, Inc ., a district court case, applied the historical tort of trespass to chattels when it held that the defendant's telemarketing robocalls had utilized the plaintiff's phone without permission. 150 Invoking this historical tradition as well as Congress's view of the matter, the court observed:
[T]he TCPA can be viewed as merely applying this common law tort to a 21st-century form of personal property and a 21st-century method of intrusion. Applying this ancient tort to these calls . . . is particularly appropriate since electronic intrusion is so much easier, and so much more readily repeated, than physical misuse of a chattel. 151 From a plaintiff's perspective, this theory carries the additional benefit of conferring standing "[e]ven if the consumer does not answer the call or hear the ring." 152 Though Mey provides the most explicit application of this tort to modern statutory violations, the court noted that it is not the first to consider the analogy to modern technology. 
Implied Bailment
Plaintiffs can also allege standing based on the common law claim for breach of an implied bailment agreement. 154 For example, in Muransky, the Eleventh Circuit compared the defendant-business's FACTA violation to older cases in which a merchant is entrusted with a customer's property and is held liable if the property is not returned in the required manner. 155 A business that accepts credit cards, then, is a bailee who must return sensitive card information without exceeding the limitations set by statute. 156 The court admitted that this theory is usually applied in the context of tangible property but nevertheless held that the analogy was close enough for Congress to use its power to create a cause of action. 157
C. Pecuniary Costs
Plaintiffs consistently establish standing when they allege the following batch of tangible harms-even when they border on the trivial. But ambiguity lingers as to where the precise divide between tangible and intangible harms lies.
The first group of cases arises under the TCPA, which prohibits various unsolicited phone calls and faxes. 158 Courts have granted standing for an array of pecuniary harms resulting from receiving unsolicited faxes, including the cost of keeping the fax machine turned on and the cost of paper and ink consumed. 159 Though unquestionably tangible, these harms amount to questionable costs. For example, Florence Endocrine Clinic v . Arriva Medical concerned a single medical form sent on four occasions. 160 influential pre-Spokeo decision in the Eleventh Circuit concluded that occupying a fax machine for even "one minute" was sufficient for standing. 161 TCPA claims from unsolicited phone calls produce similar results. Plaintiffs have received standing because unsolicited calls drain a phone's electricity, increase wear on a phone, and incur call or text charges. 162 Here, again, the actual magnitude of harm is dubious; even a generous estimate of the cost of electricity involved amounts to spare change. 163 Further, courts have held that even a single unsolicited call is sufficient for standing purposes when plaintiffs invoke one of the above theories of harm. 164 Despite the relatively trivial nature of these harms, courts have repeatedly cited these arguments to grant standing under the TCPA. 165 Courts have identified two other financial harms: mitigation costs and reduced credit scores. First, in Galaria v . Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co ., the Sixth Circuit granted standing because the plaintiffs expended "reasonably incurred mitigation costs" in responding to defendant's data breach that exposed the plaintiff to the risk of fraud. 166 Second, a lower credit score conferred standing in two cases. In Evans v . Portfolio Recovery Associates, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff's inaccurate credit rating, caused by an FDCPA violation, constituted an "appreciable risk of harm." 167 The court reasoned that an inaccurate rating "produces a variety of negative effects" [Vol. 118:471 because of its ubiquitous use. 168 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit cited the fact that the "[plaintiff's] credit score dropped 100 points" as evidence of harm caused by violation of the FCRA. 169 The final set of cases concerns wasted time caused by a defendant's statutory violation. In TCPA phone cases, courts have granted standing because plaintiffs wasted time responding to unsolicited calls and texts. 170 Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit identified the time used resolving credit inaccuracies in an FCRA case 171 and time spent destroying a receipt containing credit card number in a FACTA case as harms. 172 These cases either labeled wasted time as "intangible" 173 or made no specific finding regarding tangibility. 174 In contrast, TCPA fax cases have explicitly classified "wast[ing] the time of [plaintiff's] employees" as a "tangible injury." 175 As this survey of lower court decisions demonstrates, the Supreme Court's attempt to clarify concreteness by dividing tangible and intangible harms was insufficient; the distinction remains blurry. Wasted time seems to be intangible when not acting as an employee but tangible once a frivolous fax is answered at work. Additionally, a court can characterize occupation of a physical object in intangible, tortious terms 176 or in terms of tangible maintenance costs. 177 Plaintiffs' attorneys have cited multiple tangible hooks to avoid the morass of intangible harms, even by asserting a client's printer ink bills or electricity costs. Courts' comfort with monetary harms produces some uncomfortable results: a minuscule quantum of electricity consumed receives universal endorsement as a harm while issues of privacy, consumer deception, and accurate information receive more exacting judicial scrutiny.
D. Risks of Harm
The next category of injuries consists of various risks of harm to plaintiffs resulting from statutory violations. Spokeo acknowledged that a "risk of real harm" can be sufficiently concrete. 178 Left unspecified, however, was the "degree of risk sufficient to meet" that requirement. 179 The role of risk in standing doctrine has been subject to extensive academic examination, particularly following the Court's Clapper v . Amnesty International decision. 180 This Section will focus on two groups of cases: violations of FACTA that raise identity theft risks and violations of the FDCPA and TCPA that raise other miscellaneous risks.
Discussions of risk have played a prominent role in cases arising under FACTA, which regulates the display of customer credit card information on receipts. 181 Specifically, no "business shall print more than the last 5 digits of the card number or the expiration date upon any receipt provided to the cardholder." 182 District courts in the Eleventh Circuit have staked out a strict textual position. In Guarisma v . Microsoft Corp ., the defendant-business printed ten digits of the plaintiff's credit card number. 183 The court first identified the purpose of FACTA's procedural requirements as revealed in the legislative history, "finding [that] Congress desired to create a substantive legal right for consumers to utilize in protecting against identity theft." 184 The court then held that the injury was concrete because "FACTA created a substantive legal right for . . . consumers to receive printed receipts truncating their personal credit card numbers, and thus protecting their financial information." 185 Altman v. White House Black Mkt., Inc., No. 1:15-cv-2451-SCJ, 2016 WL 3946780, at *6 (N.D. Ga. July 13, 2016) (citing "the Congressional creation of a right and injury, as well as the language of the Senate Report which indicates that Congress did not find the risk of identity theft to be speculative"). otherwise complied with FACTA's last-five-digit requirement. 186 Finally, in its 2019 Muransky opinion, the Eleventh Circuit held that printing six additional card digits resulted in a concrete injury. 187 Several circuit courts have reached the opposite conclusion. 188 In each case, the FACTA violation at issue was, like in Wood, the printing of a customer's expiration date. In Bassett v . ABM Parking Services, the Ninth Circuit held that "it is difficult to see how issuing a receipt to only the card owner and with only the expiration date" constitutes a concrete injury, because the risk of identity theft is simply "too speculative." 189 It rejected the analogy of an expiration date to historical harms of privacy or defamation. 190 More importantly, the court concluded that the judgment of Congress, despite an explicit statutory prohibition, "weigh[ed] against Bassett" because a later amendment to FACTA clarified that "a disclosed expiration date by itself poses minimal risk." 191 The Second and Seventh Circuits reached identical conclusions, both stressing that (1) an expiration date alone is insufficient for identity theft and (2) the receipts in question were not disclosed to third parties. 192 This factual distinction-that card digits may facilitate identity theft but that expiration dates certainly cannot-has produced a slippery slope, in which other lower courts claim to rely on this distinction to deny standing in cases arising out of fact patterns increasingly attenuated from Bassett. First, the Ninth Circuit denied standing to a plaintiff when the defendant in the case had printed an extra first digit of the plaintiff's credit card number, not an expiration date. 193 The court claimed to defer to Congress's expertise but concluded that, like Bassett, the receipt had not been distributed and that a card's first digit is irrelevant information because it "merely identifies the brand of the card." 194 The next case down the slope, Katz v . Donna Karan Co ., denied standing when the defendant printed ten digits of a consumer's credit card number. 195 Katz relied on the claim, not drawn from Congress, that ten digits of a credit card are also insufficient to steal the card's information and so cannot cause injury. 196 Citing these cases, a district court case that denied standing for a receipt with the plaintiff's full credit card number and expiration date marks the bottom of the slope. 197 The court in Jeffries v . Volume Services America concluded that the risk of identity theft was too speculative because no one else saw the receipt and the plaintiff's name was not on it. 198 To prevent credit fraud, the court recommended that the plaintiff "simply discard her receipt in a public trash can." 199 Left out of this analysis is (1) any reference to the statutory text or congressional findings and (2) any explanation for how Jeffries could file a claim after throwing away the only evidence relevant to the case.
Jeffries epitomizes the tendency of courts in FACTA cases to depart from explicit statutory language and congressional statements of purpose to constrict any plaintiff's ability to enforce the statute. Taken seriously, Jeffries renders the cornerstone of a piece of congressional legislation unenforceable by imposing constitutionally derived "dissemination," "name," and "trash can" requirements. Other court opinions told plaintiffs to "shred" their receipts. 200 In minimizing plaintiffs' "speculative" identity theft harms, these courts simultaneously ignore the additional harms of anxiety about identity theft, time wasted responding to the risk, and costs of shredding. 201 In doing so, these cases create a notable discrepancy with cases arising under the FDCPA, 202 TCPA, 203 and FCRA. 204 [Vol. 118:471 Ironically, Jeffries and similar opinions also highlight limitations on judicial factfinding. While these courts claim to closely scrutinize the facts of each case, they simultaneously appear to rely on outdated or incorrect facts. As the Eleventh Circuit observed, the claim that the first six digits of a credit card pose no risk of harm originates in a single expert report filed in a 2007 district court case. 205 Subsequent court opinions recycled the finding, despite the very real possibility that technological developments in the intervening decade have invalidated the claim. 206 Courts, then, have "transformed the fact-findings of a single district court into a bright-line, no-standing rule." 207 Courts have identified two other risks beyond incremental risk of identity theft. First, the Sixth Circuit in Macy v . GC Services held that failure to properly disclose the plaintiff's rights under the FDCPA caused the harm of "greater risk of falling victim to 'abusive debt collection practices.' " 208 If a consumer followed the defendant's faulty instructions, the court reasoned, they would waive the FDCPA's protections. 209 Second, the district court in Mey held that unsolicited calls prohibited by the TCPA "cause a risk of injury due to interruption and distraction." 210 The resulting risk of automobile accidents, the court held, was a concrete injury. 211 This category demonstrates that judges have significant discretion to frame a harm either as a risk of harm or as a tortious form of harm. For example, on remand of Spokeo, the Ninth Circuit analogized Robins's injury to defamation, a tort that requires no specific harm. 212 But its discussion of Robins's reduced employment prospects also appeared to be premised on probabilities. 213 Given these two possible theories, the Ninth Circuit explicitly resisted a risk-based characterization of Robins's harm. 214 The Third Circuit offers another example of choosing between a tort-based theory and a risk-based theory of harm. In Horizon Healthcare it chose to base the plain-tiff's standing on a privacy harm rather than the harm of a risk of identity theft. 215
E. Informational Injuries
These last cases concern "informational injuries" that plaintiffs suffer from statutory violations. 216 According to the D.C. Circuit:
A plaintiff suffers sufficiently concrete and particularized informational injury where the plaintiff alleges that: (1) it has been deprived of information that . . . a statute requires the government or a third party to disclose to it, and (2) it suffers, by being denied access to that information, the type of harm Congress sought to prevent by requiring disclosure. 217 Informational injuries have been alleged in post-Spokeo consumer protection cases with varying levels of success. Primarily, informational injuries confer standing when defendants fail to disclose a plaintiff's rights under the FCRA or FDCPA. 218 For example, in Syed v . M-I, LLC, the Ninth Circuit granted standing because the defendant-employer provided the plaintiff with a disclosure document that did not "consist 'solely' of the disclosure," a violation of the FCRA. 219 The FCRA disclosure provision furthered Congress's "overarching purposes of ensuring accurate credit reporting, promoting efficient error correction, and protecting privacy." 220 But excess information in the disclosure caused confusion, depriving the plaintiff of the ability to properly consider the waiver of his rights. 221 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Macy considered a provision of the FDCPA that requires debt collectors to 215 . In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 634-35 (3d Cir. 2017). The court observed later in the opinion that "[p]laintiffs make a legitimate argument that they face an increased risk of future injury, which at least weighs in favor of standing." Id . at 639 n.19. 216. Plaintiffs have long enjoyed standing for informational injuries. See, e .g ., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-74 (1982) .
217. Friends of Animals v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 989, 992 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (concerning an unsuccessful suit for disclosure of information under the ESA).
218. Under the FCRA, "a person may not procure a consumer report . . . for employment purposes . . . unless . . . a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the consumer . . . before the report is procured . . . in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes." 15 U. inform consumers of their right to dispute the validity of the debt "in writing." 222 Though the defendant-debt collector disclosed the plaintiff's right to dispute the amount owed, it failed to specify that such complaints must be written. 223 The court granted standing, citing an analogous injury of consumer confusion because a consumer that contested a debt by telephone instead of writing would forfeit the FDCPA's protections. 224 The Second Circuit drew a dividing line for granting standing under a disclosure provision of the Truth in Lending Act: a failure to disclose the plaintiff's obligations is a concrete injury but a failure to disclose the defendant-lender's obligations is not. 225 But several circuits have denied standing under similar fact patterns. First, the Third Circuit in Long denied standing to a plaintiff on the claim that the defendant-employer failed to disclose, in writing, the plaintiff's rights under the FCRA. 226 Departing from the Sixth Circuit's Macy opinion, the Third Circuit concluded that this failure to disclose caused no injury because "[p]laintiffs became aware of their FCRA rights and were able to file this lawsuit." 227 This circular reasoning defeats Congress's purpose. By this logic, savvy employers should never disclose an employee's rights because employees will either (a) fail to file suit because of their ignorance or (b) become aware of their rights another way and sue, only to be denied standing.
Second, the Seventh Circuit encountered facts very similar to the Ninth Circuit in Syed. 228 In Groshek v . Time Warner Cable, the plaintiff received a disclosure document that, in violation of the FCRA, did not "consist[] solely of the disclosure." 229 Here, however, the Seventh Circuit denied standing because, unlike in Syed, the plaintiff "present[ed] no factual allegations plausibly suggesting that he was confused by the disclosure form." 230 Another informational injury arises when an employer fails to provide prospective employees with a copy of their credit report before taking adverse employment actions against them. 231 Denying information guaranteed by the FCRA causes plaintiffs to suffer the type of harm Congress intended to prevent-wrongful denial of employment. 232 This particular injury is the subject of the active split between the Third and Ninth Circuits. 233 These circuits disagree over whether a concrete injury has occurred even if providing a copy of the report could not have changed the plaintiff's employment outcome. 234 Two final cases arising under different statutes further flesh out standing for informational injuries. In Hagy v . Demers & Adams, the Sixth Circuit considered another FDCPA disclosure violation where a letter forgave the plaintiff's debt but " 'fail[ed] to disclose' that it was a 'communication . . . from a debt collector.' " 235 Though the letter violated the explicit statute, it did no harm. In fact, the letter gave the plaintiff "peace of mind," leading the court to conclude that the plaintiff had failed to establish standing. 236 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit held that a failure to punctually disclose satisfaction of a mortgage did not injure the plaintiff because it did not deny him any information-he "already kn[ew] that he ha[d] discharged his contractual obligation." 237 These last two cases underline the importance of the D.C. Circuit's second element of an informational injury: the plaintiff must specifically identify an injury that resulted from the denial of information that they were statutorily due. That injury is best demonstrated with a counterfactual: if the plaintiff had known, they would have acted differently.
This taxonomy demonstrates that the Spokeo Court's attempt to clarify standing doctrine instead produced confusion and divergence in the lower courts. While some intangible harms consistently confer standing, others produce results that vary between courts and between similarly structured consumer protection statutes.
IV. PROPOSING DEFERENCE TO CONGRESS
This Note contends that courts should aim for uniformity by showing greater deference to Congress's articulation of injuries that are sufficient to confer standing.
The courts and Congress have several sweeping options that would allow plaintiffs to establish injury more consistently. Apart from other actions, 238 solution. Congress's "power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation" has two major advantages when compared to judicial power. 239 First, Congress has superior factfinding abilities in complex environments. Second, it is better equipped to adapt to social, political, and technological change. 240 Identifying challenges in society and developing policy responses is the traditional realm of Congress. As an institution, it is well equipped to consider available evidence, solicit expert advice, and develop prospective responses to developing challenges. 241 The courts, by comparison, have relatively weak factfinding abilities, as demonstrated in Part III. For one, courts have treated risk-based harms inconsistently to the point of dismissing them. 242 In the series of post-Spokeo FACTA cases, judges' intuitions about likelihood of harm diverged from the judgment of Congress. 243 The Dutta-Long split also cautions against making cut-and-dry risk determinations that depart from Congress's conclusions. 244 Courts should be particularly hesitant about making decisive determinations on the likelihood of any particular harm occurring in complex environments, like in employeremployee relationships. 245 Though courts should not treat Congress's identification of harms as decisive for purposes of standing, they similarly should not brashly dismiss the benefits of prophylactic procedural requirements. 246 Independent of calculating risk, courts may also simply misunderstand the harms that result from particular statutory violations. Fact-gathering on standing issues is structurally limited by the fact that it is a jurisdictional in-MARY L. REV. 2285, 2359-69 (2018). Congress, too, could act either by tying private rights of action to a cash bounty system or by vesting plaintiffs with a property right to confer a tangible interest in enforcing statutes. See [Vol. 118:471 Congress can act on the basis of future risks and determine that they are sufficient to justify creation of a private cause of action. 257 Statutory causes of action can also adapt to changing values. Because a single provision can further several interests simultaneously, courts should be wary of dismissing a plaintiff's alleged injury by narrowly construing the values at stake. The Dutta-Long split epitomizes the issue. In Dutta, the Ninth Circuit focused on the narrow interest of correcting inaccurate credit reports. 258 By comparison, in Long, the Third Circuit emphasized other intangible interests of fairness, transparency, and an opportunity to tell one's story independent of any particular pecuniary outcome. 259 The Third Circuit's approach assigns intrinsic value to procedure and is reminiscent of the work of Jeremy Waldron. Waldron argues that procedure is valuable not just for its results but also for its "dignitarian aspect: it conceives of the people who live under it as bearers of reason and intelligence." 260 The Third Circuit also likened plaintiffs' injury to historical conceptions of privacy torts premised on "interference with an individual's ability to control his personal information." 261 This difference in approach not only better fulfills Congress's interests as communicated in statutory text but also better subscribes to Spokeo's historical considerations.
The Third Circuit's Long opinion, however, also exhibits a perplexing vision of informational injuries. Though the court granted plaintiffs standing under the prior disclosure provision, it denied standing for SEPTA's failure to disclose plaintiffs' rights under the FCRA. 262 The court claimed that the plaintiffs were unharmed by SEPTA's oversight because they were informed of their rights by other means-evidenced only by the fact that they successfully filed suit against SEPTA. 263 This conclusion seems to suggest, however, that a harm, or lack thereof, caused by a procedural interest can be inferred purely from the outcome. Such an inference conflicts with the court's prior claim that a disclosure requirement is not conditioned "on whether having the report would allow an individual to stave off an adverse" outcome. 264 that unsophisticated consumers would not fall victim to deceptive practices or accidentally forgo their rights. 265 There is also reason to believe that a deferential stance would simply produce more coherent doctrine. Deferring to congressional factfinding would help resolve three troubling doctrinal trends. First, deference would reduce the incentive for plaintiffs to launder intangible harms as tangible harms by seizing on trivial monetary losses. 266 For example, consider what options are left to plaintiffs in Dutta's position. By narrowing the path for alleging a pure informational injury, the Ninth Circuit incentivizes standing arguments that pander to courts' apparent comfort with pecuniary harms. As the string of TCPA cases demonstrates, intangible harms are amenable to being reframed as, often trivial, tangible harms. 267 Dutta's harms, for example, could be reframed as (1) the monetary cost of obtaining and printing one's own reports, (2) the time and inconvenience of disputing inaccuracies, not to mention (3) the cost of phone charges and electricity consumed in the process. Following cases like Mey or Florence Endocrine, these claims should have traction with lower courts, and would certainly fulfill an apparent desire to tie procedural violations to a tangible injury to the plaintiff. It is difficult to argue, however, that they would create a more satisfying basis for the underlying policy concerns that motivated Congress to write the FCRA in the first place. 268 Second, deferring to Congress's articulation of intangible injuries would reduce the significance of the tangible-intangible divide altogether. As Rachel Bayefsky argues, "the line between tangible and intangible harm is not a deep-seated or clear-cut feature of empirical reality, but a contextually sensitive boundary." 269 When judges distinguish between the two, they inevitably invoke their own normative assumptions as seemingly "obvious" tangible harms are separated from the more complex intangible ones. 270 For example, courts have disagreed on whether lost time is tangible or intangible in nature. 271 Similarly, informational injuries skirt the tangible-intangible divide, particularly when the information in question could determine a job applicant's employment. 272 Finally, deferring to Congress would produce more consistent outcomes. Currently, a plaintiff's fate may hang on a court's readiness to engage in historical analogy. The outcome in Muransky, for example, differs from other circuits in large part because the Eleventh Circuit searched for more apt historical analogies to printing a customer's credit card information. 273 FCRA cases, including the Ninth Circuit's treatment of Spokeo on remand, also demonstrate the extent to which outcomes are determined by how a harm is characterized. 274 Ultimately, courts may simply be the wrong forum for determining which statutory causes of action are truly necessary to shelter individuals from concrete harms and which are merely superfluous procedural details. Deference to congressional identification of injuries in procedural rights cases could resemble rational basis review. Under rational basis review, a court upholds a law so long as there is a rational relationship between the chosen means and a legitimate interest. 275 The law may be wrongheaded or trivial, but that judgment is for Congress to make, not the courts. 276 A court should conclude that a statutory violation, enforceable by a private right of action, causes a concrete injury if a rational legislature could have concluded the procedural right was related to an actionable injury. Standing doctrine could remain unchanged in other contexts. 277 The consumer protection laws highlighted in this Note may not be worth the trouble of enforcement, "[b]ut it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages" of such policies. 278 A deferential stance would produce fairer, more predictable outcomes for those that Congress saw fit to protect. A court's faulty factual reasoning should not stand as a barrier to deserved relief. 279 A deferential approach coheres with traditional justifications for standing doctrine. The most prominent justification for standing is respecting the separation of powers between branches. 280 Yet consumer protection cases do not raise concerns of asserting general grievances-suits are filed against private companies and allege conduct as to particular plaintiffs. 281 The executive branch is neither conscripted into action nor relieved of its Take Care Clause duties. 282 Instead, capricious invalidation of congressional statutes raises far more pernicious separation-of-powers concerns. 283 Courts also should not strictly construe Spokeo in order to manage caseloads and conserve judicial resources. 284 First, as an empirical matter, predictions of flooding federal courtrooms with frivolous litigation are difficult to disprove. 285 Second, conforming an explicitly constitutional doctrine to concern for judicial resources raises important issues of judicial legitimacy. 286 Rather, Congress has authority in such areas of technocratic management and could allocate additional resources to the judiciary if necessary. 287 Nor does greater deference to Congress necessitate abrogating Spokeo. In part, Spokeo's holding is narrow in application. The opinion's opentextured language, requiring support of history and Congress, does not de- [Vol. 118:471 mand limiting standing to the extent that some lower courts have. 288 On remand, the Ninth Circuit was able to reach its original outcome despite the Supreme Court's tightening of concreteness. 289 The Third and Eleventh Circuits, too, have engaged in Spokeo's two-factor analysis and identified injuries that reflect a pragmatic, dynamic understanding of intangible harms. 290 Ultimately, Spokeo's bare terms may simply exclude standing for statutory violations that have no rational connection to underlying harm-whether as defined by history 291 or by congressional judgment. 292 Where there is room for reasonable disagreement, a court should defer to Congress. Spokeo's evident unmanageability also suggests that lower courts should, faithfully applying Court precedent, confine its reach. 293 Courts should examine history and congressional judgment, but should not let the opinion's formalism obstruct the application of plain statutes. Finally, if courts cannot practically defer to Congress's superior judgment while faithfully following Spokeo, then the Court should revisit its decision.
CONCLUSION
Application of Spokeo in the lower courts has produced a confused, inconsistent standing doctrine. Outcomes for plaintiffs currently differ both across jurisdictions and across similar statutes. Arbitrary doctrine is particularly concerning for the federal system of consumer protection laws that relies on consumers to vindicate their own statutory rights. This Note has made two contributions. First, it sorted the various intangible harms that courts have identified in the wake of Spokeo into categories. In doing so, it highlighted areas of consistency, contradiction, and continued ambiguity. Second, it called for greater judicial deference to congressional factfinding. Deferring to Congress's statutory language would result in both more responsive and effective enforcement of consumer protection laws as well as a more coherent standing doctrine for the courts to apply.
